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• March 2015 
• For purposes of coverage under title insurance policy, a notice of abatement action is not 
a defect, lien, or encumbrance on title. 
Stockton Mortgage, Inc. v Tope (2014) 233 CA4th 437 
In a cross-action against a title insurance company following a default on a real estate loan 
to purchase and rehabilitate a home, the court of appeal granted summary judgment in favor of 
the insurer, First American Title. The plaintiffs, investors in the loan, sued various parties 
(including First American) for damages arising from the alleged failure to follow up on the status 
of a release of notice of abatement action, which had been listed on the preliminary title report as 
an exception to coverage, with a statement that “Prior to close of Escrow Alliance Title 
Company [the escrow holder] will require a FULL RELEASE be obtained.” The investors had 
been solicited by Stockton Mortgage Real Estate Loan Servicing Corporation (Stockton 
Mortgage) for money to be used to fund the loan. Stockton Mortgage was one of the cross-
complainants that initiated the cross-action against First American, Alliance, and two of 
Alliance’s employees. 
Before close of escrow, Alliance had contacted the County Environmental Health 
Department to obtain a release of the notice of abatement, but the County would not issue the 
release because violations still existed. The lender’s policy covered “a defect in or lien or 
encumbrance on the title” of the property and did not list a notice of abatement as an exception 
from coverage. The court concluded that the notice of abatement was not a defect, lien, or 
encumbrance on title to the property; instead, it was only a notice that the premises were 
substandard, which merely related to the physical condition of the property and raised the issue 
of future enforcement. Further, the accrual of enforcement costs did not transform the notice of 
abatement into a defect in or a lien or encumbrance on title. Although the County engaged in 
some limited abatement activity and sought to recoup its “enforcement costs” (totaling $2005 
and paid by Alliance before close of escrow), the County had not recorded a lien against the 
property to recover its costs. Any accrual after the close of escrow, as a post-policy event, would 
not be covered under the policy. 
In any event, the cross-complainants were not insured under the lender’s policy. Stockton 
Mortgage never had an interest in the land or held an indebtedness secured by the deed of trust. 
Rather, Stockton Management was named as the beneficiary under the deed of trust. 
Furthermore, it had assigned its beneficial interest under the deed of trust to the investors. 
Without an interest in the property or indebtedness under the deed of trust after the assignment to 
the investors, the cross-complainants were not insured under the policy. 
The court also rejected the cross-complainants’ argument that because they had potential 
liability for warranties and covenants made in connection with the assignment of the deed of 
trust, they were still covered under the policy. The cross-complainants failed to identify what 
warranties or covenants they gave to the investors as part of the assignment. They also failed to 
establish that they had standing as third party beneficiaries under the policy by way of a 
servicing agreement with the investors. According to the court (233 CA4th at 451), “This novel 
argument goes nowhere.” 
The cross-complainants argued that Alliance, acting as agent for First American, orally 
agreed to remove the abatement notice before the close of escrow. The only evidence for this 
purported oral agreement was the preliminary report; the court refused to infer an oral agreement 
based on the statement in the report. At most, the evidence showed that Alliance, not First 
American, entered into an oral agreement. 
The court also found without merit the cross-complainants’ negligence, negligent 
misrepresentation, and implied and equitable indemnity causes of action. 
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: Alliance Title Company was able to dodge liability for failing to 
inform its insured about the county’s recorded and unreleased Notice of Abatement 
Action because the court of appeal deemed that notice was not a defect, lien, or 
encumbrance against the title that Alliance was insuring, such that the failure to 
mention it as an exception in the insurance policy did not make the insurer liable.  
Everyone appreciates that title insurance policies insure titles to real property, not 
the property itself. There is a difference between a defect in the soil of property and a 
defect in the title to that soil, with only the latter being covered by a title insurance 
policy. But while the difference between the two may often be clear, their paths are 
often murky and convergent. 
A faulty condition of property frequently must follow a long, winding course before it 
elevates itself to a condition of title that a title insurer must report to its customer. The 
property flaw may start life as a mere potential defect in property (e.g., a loose screw 
in a piece of wood) that everyone except a fussy owner may ignore, both physically 
and from a title perspective. If the condition gets too bad (the screw gets too loose), 
someone (e.g., a tenant or a neighbor) may complain about it, and someone else 
(such as a building inspector) may do something about it, e.g., order its repair. A 
report may be filed and the condition will thereby be elevated into a formal grievance 
or command to the property owner to fix. See Health & S C §17980. But the existence 
of such a commanding document does not necessarily mean that the owner’s title has 
as yet been impaired. According to this decision, a governmental order to abate a 
code violation is not yet a defect, nor a lien nor an encumbrance, on title as to make 
the owner’s title unmarketable. 
(Technically, the limitations of marketable title should inform interested purchasers 
of the property that they should provide for inspection contingencies in their offers 
rather than expect traditional marketable title to function as an exit device at close of 
escrow; she may be getting a marketable title even if there is a screw loose 
somewhere bothering an inspector.) 
Only later—after a local official has made an authorized correction of the disrepair 
and the municipality has failed to recover those costs from the owner—might the 
owner’s title be brought into the picture. If the repair bill isn’t reimbursed, Health & S C 
§17980.2(b) allows a lien to be imposed and recorded. Once a recorded lien is on the 
property, not only does the house itself owe the repair cost (CC §1114; CCP §1180), 
but equally importantly, so does its next owner, whether or not she ever assented to 
its imposition. The repair cost has become a lien on the land—like a mortgage—
intruding on the current owner’s ability to transfer marketable title to the purchaser 
unless it is removed. Purchasers get the law much more on their side at close of 
escrow when and if a physical defect has elevated itself into a title defect. 
The stakes also get considerably higher because a defect affecting title makes that 
title unmarketable whether or not it carries any demonstrable economic harm along 
with it. A purchaser can reject a title as unmarketable because it is subject to an 
easement or covenant or declaration of CCRs, even though the property itself may be 
a good deal more valuable with it than without it. 
So transactors in real estate have to treat governmental complaints differently from 
liens and encumbrances and defects on title because the system treats them so 
differently. With or without superlien priority, an old physical complaint recently 
elevated into a title defect may have acquired a legal stature it previously lacked. That 
makes it unsurprising that title insurance companies need to report on defective 
conditions that may someday grow into liens on title differently from how they treat the 
conditions that are already liens. Conventional mortgages, easements, or restrictive 
covenants generally impacted titles long ago, when they were first recorded 
(regardless of how much they were paid down, used, or enforced), so purchasers and 
lenders had to be warned of them at the start, differently from those inchoate liens that 
spring up when a local government gets mad enough.—Roger Bernhardt 
 
